Backlash: The Court Protects the Entrenched Advantages of the Majority by Allison, Gary D. & Bullock, Louis W.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 31 
Issue 3 Practitioner's Guide to the October 1994 
Supreme Court Term 
Spring 1996 
Backlash: The Court Protects the Entrenched Advantages of the 
Majority 
Gary D. Allison 
Louis W. Bullock 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gary D. Allison, & Louis W. Bullock, Backlash: The Court Protects the Entrenched Advantages of the 
Majority, 31 Tulsa L. J. 425 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol31/iss3/2 
This Legal Scholarship Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For 
more information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
BACKLASH: THE COURT PROTECTS THE
ENTRENCHED ADVANTAGES OF
THE MAJORITY*
Gary D. Allisont and Louis W. Bullock:
I. INTRODUCTION
The October 1994 Term's equal opportunity cases dramatically
weakened the ability of government to provide equal opportunity in
three very important areas of life. In Missouri v. Jenkins,' the Court
limited the power of federal courts to help victims of unconstitution-
ally segregated public schools. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,2
the Court significantly reduced the ability of Congress to use race as a
factor in enacting equal opportunity business programs. Finally, in
Miller v. Johnson,' the Court intimated that it may never be constitu-
tional to create congressional districts in which a racial minority con-
stitutes a majority, or near majority, of the voters. Each case bitterly
split the Court five to four and spawned at least four opinions offering
sharply contrasting views as to how much equality government may
constitutionally promote among the races.'
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner's Guide to the October 1994
Supreme Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, November 17, 1995. Analysis
by Gary D. Allison and Louis W. Bullock as annotated and edited by Gary D. Allison.
t Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. B.S., University of Tulsa (1968);
J.D., University of Tulsa College of Law (1972); L.L.M., Columbia University School of Law
(1976).
t Bullock & Bullock, Tulsa, Oklahoma. B.S., Oklahoma A. & M.; J.D. University of
Oklahoma (1975).
1. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
2. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
3. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
4. In each case, the majority consisted of the hard conservative trio of Justices Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Thomas joined by the moderately conservative swing duo of Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy; and the dissent consisted of the liberal trio of Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined by the moderately liberal swingman Justice Souter. Four opinions, including one concur-
rence and two dissents, were filed in Miller. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2482. Five opinions, including
two concurrences and two dissents, were filed in Jenkins. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2042. Adarand
produced the most fractious outcome with six opinions being filed, three for the judgment and
1
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II. MIssoURI V. JENKINS: SEPARATE BUT UNEQUAL?
In a country where there is "no distinction of class," Lord Ac-
ton wrote of the United States 130 years ago, "a child is not born to
the station of its parents, but with an indefinite claim to all the
prizes that can be won by thought and labor. It is in conformity
with the theory of equality ... to give as near as possible to every
youth an equal state in life." Americans, he said, "are unwilling that
any should be deprived in childhood of the means of competition."
It is hard to read these words today without a sense of irony
and sadness. Denial of "the means of competition" is perhaps the
single most consistent outcome of the education offered to poor
children in the schools of our large cities ...
Jenkins is the latest chapter in a federal district court's eighteen
year attempt to remedy the effects of unconstitutional segregation in
the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD). In 1977, Mis-
souri, several federal agencies, and surrounding school districts
(SSDs) were charged in federal court with perpetuating racial segrega-
tion in Kansas City area schools.6 In 1984, after a long litigation pro-
cess, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri found the KCMSD and Missouri guilty of maintaining an
unconstitutionally segregated school system. 7 However, the federal
agencies and the SSDs were exonerated.8 The court has since strug-
gled to remedy three broad effects of the illegal segregation: (1) seg-
regation of minority children in racially identifiable schools, 9 (2)
unquantified system-wide reduction in student achievement, 10 and (3)
three against it, none of which commanded a majority of the justices. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at
2101.
5. JONATHAN Kozoz., SAVAGE INEOUALrrIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S ScHooLs 83
(1991) (quoting in part George A. Hickrod, Reply to the 'Forbes' Article, J. ScH. FIN. (1987)).
6. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2042. The case was based on the fact that twenty years after the
United States Supreme Court declared de jure segregation of public schools to be unconstitu-
tional in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 39 of KCMSD's 77 schools had
student bodies that were at least 90% African-American, and over 80% of KCMSD's African-
American students attended these schools. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2074 (Souter, J., dissenting).
7. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1505 (W.D. Mo. 1984) [hereinafter Initial
Jenkins].
8. Id. at 1488, 1490.
9. The district court found that even as late as 1984, 25 of KCMSD's schools had student
bodies that were 90% or more African-American. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19,36 (W.D.
Mo. 1985) [hereinafter Jenkins Remedy 1].
10. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that "[t]he District Court made no particularized
findings regarding the extent that student achievement had been reduced or what portion of that
reduction was attributable to segregation." Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2042.
[Vol. 31:425
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severe physical deterioration of KCMSD's facilities.'1 Jenkins con-
cerns Missouri's latest challenges to the scope of remedies chosen by
the district court.12
Integrating the KCMSD, with its 68.3% African-American stu-
dent population, has been the court's greatest problem. 13 Having ex-
onerated the SSDs, the court could not constitutionally order transfers
of white students from the SSDs to the KCMSD.' 4 The court declined
to order mandatory intradistrict student transfers, fearing such trans-
fers could hamper desegregation by causing further white flight.' 5 In-
stead, the court initiated a process to make KCMSD schools
outstanding enough to attract non-minority students from private and
SSD schools.' 6 Accordingly, the court ordered Missouri and the
KCMSD to:
* establish magnet programs at half of KCMSD's elementary
schools and all of its high schools and middle schools at a cost
of $448 million;17
* undertake a capital improvement program for renovating fifty
five schools, shutting down eighteen schools, and constructing
seventeen new schools at a cost of over $540 million;' 8
* implement ambitious remedial quality education programs at
every KCMSD school at a cost of $220 million;' 9 and
11. Jenkins Remedy 1, 639 F. Supp. at 40.
The specific problems include[d]: inadequate lighting, peeling paint and crumbling
plaster on ceilings, walls and corridors; loose tiles, torn floor coverings; odors resulting
from unventilated restrooms with rotted, corroded toilet fixtures; noisy classrooms due
to lack of adequate acoustical treatment; lack of off street parking and bus loading for
parents, teachers and students; lack of appropriate space for many cafeterias, libraries,
and classrooms; faulty and antiquated heating and electrical systems; damaged and in-
operable lockers; and inadequate fire safety systems ....
Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 403 (W.D. Mo. 1987) [hereinafter Jenkins Remedy III].
12. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2042.
13. See Jenkins Remedy 1. 639 F. Supp. at 38.
14. In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the U.S. Supreme Court held that interdis-
trict remedies are valid only to cure "interdistrict segregation directly caused by the constitu-
tional violation." Id. at 745.
15. Jenkins Remedy 1, 639 F. Supp. at 38.
16. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2042-46.
17. Id. at 2043 (discussing the substance of the district court's unpublished remedial order
of November 16, 1986).
18. Jenkins Remedy Ii, 672 F. Supp. at 408; Jenkins Remedy 1, 639 F. Supp. at 40-41. See
Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2044 (discussing the cost estimate).
19. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2043. The quality remedial education programs included improve-
ments in the regular academic program sufficient for KCMSD to receive the state's highest aca-
demic rating, substantial reductions in class sizes, expanded opportunities programs such as full
day kindergarten, before and after school tutoring, an expanded summer school program, and
effective school grants. Jenkins Remedy I, 639 F. Supp. at 26, 28-43. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at
2043 (explaining the cost of these programs).
3
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* maintain high quality academic faculty and support staff
through salary assistance programs costing over $200 million
since 1987.20
The KCMSD's desegregation program is the most expensive ever
ordered judicially, with an annual cost far exceeding KCMSD's taxing
authority under Missouri law.21 Not surprisingly, Missouri challenged
the orders to provide salary assistance and to continue the remedial
quality education programs, contending they were not narrowly tai-
lored to reverse the effects of illegal segregation.22
Both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit rejected Missouri's arguments. Each found the salary
assistance was necessary to promote the KCMSD's "desegregative at-
tractiveness '2 3 in order to reverse white flight.2 4 Additionally, they
supported the continuation of the remedial quality education pro-
grams because KCMSD student achievement indicated that the nega-
tive effect of segregation on student performance had not yet been
eradicated.25
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' judgments.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized the
district court's salary adjustment order and other remedies as "fo-
cused on 'desegregative attractiveness,' coupled with 'suburban com-
parability.' '26 He also noted that the district court's desegregation
plan is "not designed solely to redistribute the students within the
KCMSD ... to eliminate racially identifiable schools .... Instead, its
purpose is to attract nonminority students from outside the KCMSD
schools."2 7 Thus, the Court found that the district court's remedies
exceed the constitutionally permitted scope of desegregation remedies
in three ways:
(1) they seek to attract students from other districts, thereby do-
ing indirectly what the Supreme Court has forbidden district
courts to do directly-seek transfers of nonminority students
from other districts in absence of an interdistrict violation;
20. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2044-45.
21. Id. at 2045.
22. Id. at 2045-46.
23. See id. at 2045 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at A-90).
24. Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755, 767 (8th Cir. 1993).
25. Id. at 761-62.
26. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050.
27. Id. at 2051.
28. Id. at 2051-54. Here, the Court extended its Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974),
holding that court ordered transfers of students across district lines are unconstitutional where
[Vol. 31:425
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 31 [1995], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol31/iss3/2
THE COURT PROTECTS THE MAJORITY
(2) their "desegregative attractiveness" rationale "is not suscepti-
ble to any objective limitation" strictly concerned with restor-
ing "the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position
they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct; 29
and
(3) they contain no "limits to the duration of the District Court's
involvement," in violation of the requirement that federal
courts must strive to return control to state and local authori-
ties, because the KCMSD has been unable to identify how to
pay for the remedial and magnet programs without special
state aid that Missouri will not provide absent district court
compulsion.30
Similar considerations caused the Supreme Court to overturn the
lower courts' decisions requiring Missouri to continue paying for the
remedial quality education programs. The Court found that the dis-
trict court had adopted national student achievement norms as the
measure of whether KCMSD student achievement had improved suf-
ficiently, but had failed to make findings as to the precise effect segre-
gation had on student achievement. 31 Therefore, said the Court,
national student achievement norms are not appropriate tests for de-
termining "whether the reduction in achievement by minority stu-
dents attributable to prior de jure segregation has been remedied to
the extent practicable."'32
there has not been an interdistrict violation to court ordered improvements of segregated dis-
tricts designed to lure students from other districts in the absence of an interdistrict violation.
Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2051-54.
29. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2054. The requirement that desegregation remedies must be
designed to put the victims of illegal segregation back into the position they would have occu-
pied in absence of segregation was articulated forcefully in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,746
(1974).
30. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2054. The requirement that federal district courts must strive to
return control over school districts to state and local authorities was articulated most strongly in
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977).
31. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055-56.
32. Id. The Court expressly ruled that the KCMSD and Missouri could not be held respon-
sible for curing any negative affects on student achievement being caused by factors external to
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III. ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC V. .PENA: PRESUMING
EQUALITY IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD
[T]here are those who say ... that even good affirmative action
programs are no longer needed ... because there is no longer any
systematic discrimination in our society.
... [L]et us consider the facts. The unemployment rate for Afri-
can Americans remains about twice that of whites. The Hispanic
rate is still much higher. Women ... still make only 72 percent as
much as men do for comparable jobs.
The average income for an Hispanic woman with a college de-
gree is still less than the average income of a white man with a high
school diploma.
According to ... the glass ceiling report sponsored by Republi-
can members of Congress, in the nation's largest companies only
six-tenths of I percent of senior management positions are held by
African Americans, four-tenths of a percent by Hispanic Ameri-
cans, three-tenths of a percent by Asian Americans. Women hold
between 3 and 5 percent of these positions. White males make up 43
percent of our work force but hold 95 percent of these jobs.
... [B]lack home loan applicants are more than twice as likely
to be denied credit as whites with the same qualifications, and ...
Hispanic applicants are more than 1/2 times as likely to be denied
loans as whites with the same qualifications.
Last year... the federal government received more than 90,000
complaints of employment discrimination based on race, ethnicity
or gender; less than 3 percent were for reverse discrimination.33
Mountain Gravel and Construction Co. (Mountain) was awarded
a highway construction contract by the U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation (DOT).34 The contract fell under the Surface Transportation
and Uniform Relocations Assistance Act (STURAA) 35 requirements
that "'not less than 10 percent' of the appropriated funds 'shall be
expended with small business concerns owned and controlled by so-
cially and economically disadvantaged individuals.' 36 Accordingly,
the contract contained an incentive clause offering Mountain a small
33. President Clinton, Address defending the need to continue some affirmative action pro-
grams (July 19, 1995), in 'Give AllAmericans a Chance ...,' WASH. PosT, July 20, 1995, at A12.
34. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2102 (1995).
35. Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocations Assistance Act (STURAA), Pub. L.
No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132. (codified at scattered sections of 23 U.S.C. (1994)).
36. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103 (quoting STURAA § 106 (c)(1), 101 Stat. 132, 145).
[Vol. 31:425
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bonus for awarding subcontracts to Disadvantaged Business Enter-
prises (DBEs).
Mountain awarded a subcontract for installing guardrails to the
Gonzales Construction Co., a certified DBE, despite Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. (Adarand), a non-DBE, submitting the lowest low
bid.38 Adarand would have won the subcontract but for the incentive
available to Mountain for selecting a DBE subcontractor.39
Adarand filed suit contending that three federal regulatory
schemes for certifying persons as DBEs-the Small Business Admin-
istration (SBA) DBE certification regulations under Sections 8(a) and
8(d) of the Small Business Act, and DOT DBE certification regula-
tions issued to implement STURAA-contained race-based presump-
tions of disadvantage that violated its equal protection rights under
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.40 Persons
entitled to the presumptions are automatically designated as socially
and/or economically disadvantaged unless they are shown not to be
disadvantaged by clear and convincing evidence offered by challeng-
ers during a certification or review process.41 Persons not of a pre-
sumptively disadvantaged racial and ethnic ancestry may receive DBE
certification only by presenting regulators with clear and convincing
evidence of their disadvantaged backgrounds.42
The critical issue was determining which standard of constitution-
ality should be applied to congressionally authorized racial classifica-
tions. Adarand contended that the race-based presumptions were
37. The incentive equaled 10% of the sum of all DBE subcontract amounts not to exceed
1.5% of the prime contract when one DBE subcontract is awarded or 2% of the prime contract
amount if two or more DBE subcontracts are awarded. Id. at 2104.
38. Id at 2102.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2102-04. Persons are presumed to be disadvantaged socially if they are Black,
Hispanic, Asian Pacific, Subcontinent Asian, Native American, or other minorities designated by
the SBA as disadvantaged. 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.105(b)(1), 124.106(b) (1994) (§ 8a and § 8d regula-
tions respectively). These groups plus women are presumed to be disadvantaged under
STURAA regulations. 49 C.F.R. § 23.62 and pt. 23, subpt. D, App. C (1994). STURAA regula-
tions extend the presumptions to both the socially and economically disadvantaged. Id. How-
ever, each person must individually prove economic disadvantage under the § 8a program. 13
C.F.R. § 124.106(a) (1994). It is not clear whether individualized showings of economic disad-
vantage are required under the § 8d program. Compare 13 C.F.R. § 124.106(b) (1994) (requiring
individual showings) with 48 C.F.R. §§ 19.001, 19.703(a)(2) (1994) (requiring no individual
showings).
41. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.105(b)(1), 124.106(a)(b) (1994) (certification is automatic for per-
sons enjoying a presumption of disadvantage). But see 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.111(c),(d), 124.602(a)
(§ 8a program); 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.601-.609 (§ 8d program); 49 C.F.R § 23.69 (STURAA pro-
gram); in which presumptions are rebuttable.
42. 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(c) (1994) (§ 8a program); 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(c) (1994) and 48
C.F.R. § 19.703(a)(2) (1994) (§ 8d program); 49 C.F.R § 23.62 (1994) (STURAA program).
1996]
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unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny test of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.,43 which requires state authorized racial classifications to
be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest,44
because they were not designed to remedy the effects of specifically
identified government discrimination 4:5
Stating they were bound by Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,46
because the race-based presumptions were congressionally author-
ized, both the district court and court of appeals used Metro's interme-
diate scrutiny test.47 Metro permits congressionally authorized benign
racial classifications to be found constitutional, whether or not they
are designed to remediate specific governmental or society-wide dis-
crimination, provided they are substantially related to serving impor-
tant governmental interests .4  Applying this test, each court upheld
the constitutionality of the race-based DBE certification processes be-
cause they:
(1) contained mechanisms to insure that minorities enjoying the
presumptions of disadvantage were both disadvantaged and
qualified to perform contracts under the program;49
43. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Croson is the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court produced
a majority for the proposition that courts should use a strict scrutiny standard to determine the
constitutionality of racial classifications used by state and local governments to remediate the
effects of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
493-94. See also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108-10 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's struggle to
secure a majority view regarding the standard to be used in determining the constitutionality of
race-based classifications used for remedial purposes).
44. Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-92.
45. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 F.3d 1537, 1542 (10th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter
Adarand Circuit]. Here, Adarand relied on Croson's requirement that there is no compelling
state interest in using racial classifications absent a showing of specific governmental discrimina-
tion. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-92.
46. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
47. Adarand Circuit, 16 F.3d at 154345; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp.
240, 242-44 (D. Col. 1992) [hereinafter Adarand District].
48. Metro, 497 U.S. at 563-66. In Metro, the Court justified treating congressionally author-
ized racial classifications differently than state authorized racial classifications because:
* Congress is owed deference in these matters as "a co-equal branch charged by the Consti-
tution with the power to 'provide for the ... general Welfare of the United States' and 'to
enforce, by appropriate legislation,' the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 563 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980)); and
* "the Federal Government is unlikely to be captured by minority racial or ethnic groups
and used as an instrument of discrimination" while "'[tlhe struggle for racial justice has
historically been a struggle by the national society against oppression in the individual
States' because of the 'heightened danger of oppression from political factions in small,
rather than large, political units."' Id. at 566 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 522-23 (Scalia,
J., concurring)).
49. Adarand District, 790 F. Supp. at 244.
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(2) did not prevent disadvantaged non-minorities from receiving
benefits,50 and
(3) induced, rather than compelled, the use of DBEs.51
A very divided U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgments of
the lower courts52 and Metro's standard of constitutional review by
holding that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal,
state or local governmental actor,... are constitutional only if they
are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests. 53 Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor noted how diffi-
cult it had been prior to Croson for the Court to produce a majority
view as to the correct standard to apply in judging the constitutionality
of state authorized benign racial classifications under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 She expressed her
view that the Court had taken great care prior to Metro to treat all
racial classifications, whether authorized by the states or Congress,
with:
* skepticism: meaning they all should be regarded as inherently
suspect;
* consistency: meaning the standard of review should be the
same no matter what the race is of those burdened; and
* congruence: meaning that the equal protection analysis should
be the same whether it is conducted under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the equal protec-
tion notions of the Fifth Amendment.55
Justice O'Connor then opined that Metro, the first case questioning
what standard of review applied to congressionally authorized racial
classifications after Croson, should be overturned because it under-
mined the Court's prior dedication to the principles of skepticism,
consistency, and congruence.56 The Court did not find the race based
presumptions to be unconstitutional, however, because the lower
50. Adarand Circuit, 16 F.3d at 1547.
51. Id.
52. Adarand Constructors Inc., v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2102, 2118 (1995).
53. Id. at 2113. Note, the Court produced these results without an opinion which com-
manded a majority of the justices. Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion described as the judgment
of the Court, but it was joined fully only by Justice Kennedy. See id. at 2101. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined the opinion except a portion dealing with stare decisis. See
id. However, Justice Scalia joined the opinion only to the degree to which it agreed with his
separate concurring opinion. Id. at 2118-19.
54. Id. at 2108-10.
55. Id. at 2111.
56. Id. at 2111-13.
1996]
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courts had not judged it by the strict scrutiny standard.5 7 Accordingly,
the Court remanded Adarand to the court of appeals for a strict scru-
tiny review of the DBE certification processes.58
IV. MLLER V. JOHNSOA A TYRANNY OF THE MAJORTY?
Although race-conscious districting is their apparent target ....
critics [of the Voting Rights Act] have fixed their aim on a deeper
message-that pressing claims of racial identity and racial disadvan-
tage diminish democracy. We all lose, the theory goes, when some
of us identify in racial or ethnic group terms.
... [Critics of race-conscious districting have misdirected their
fire. ... [They] fail to confront directly the group nature of repre-
sentation itself, especially in a system of geographic districting. Per-
haps unwittingly they also reveal a bias toward the representation of
a particular racial group rather than their discomfort with group
representation itself. In a society as deeply cleaved by issues of ra-
cial identity as ours, ... a system of representation that fails to pro-
vide group representation loses legitimacy.59
The 1990 Census gave Georgia an additional congressional dis-
trict, so it had to undertake reapportionment.60 As a jurisdictional
state under § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA),61 Geor-
gia's redistricting plan had to receive either U.S. Justice Department
(DOJ) preclearance or federal district court approval.62 The DOJ
twice rejected reapportionment plans containing two majority-minor-
ity congressional districts.63 Ultimately, Georgia's General Assembly
received DOJ approval of a reapportionment plan-labeled the max-
black plan6 -which provided for three majority-minority districts.65
This plan gave African-American candidates from Georgia a greater
opportunity to be elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in pro-
portion to Georgia's African-American population (27.27% to
26.96%).66
57. ld. at 2118.
58. Id.
59. LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAjoRun': FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRE.
SENTATrVE DEMOCRACY 120-21 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
60. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2483 (1995).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1994).
62. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483.
63. Id. at 2483-84. Majority-minority districts are those in which a minority group consti-
tutes a majority of the voting age population. Id. at 2483.
64. Id. at 2484.
65. Id. at 2483.
66. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1378, 1385-86 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
[Vol. 31:425
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The max-black plan was challenged by white voters in the new
Eleventh Congressional District,67 who "alleged that Georgia's Elev-
enth District was a racial gerrymander and so a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause."' 68 These claims relied on Shaw v. Reno,69 a recent
case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that:
[A] plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal
Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation,
though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as
anything other than an effort to separate voters into different dis-
tricts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient
justification.70
In Shaw, the Supreme Court further held that redistricting plans dom-
inated by race considerations are constitutional only if they are nar-
rowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.7'
By a two to one vote, a three-judge district court declared Geor-
gia's reapportionment plan to be unconstitutional.72 The court inter-
preted Shaw to require that reapportionment plans be subjected to
strict scrutiny if it is shown "that the legislature (a) was consciously
influenced by race, and (b) ... race was the overriding, predominant
force determining the lines of the district."73 It then found race to be
the "overriding, predominant force" in influencing Georgia's adoption
of the max-black plan.74 Finally, the court held that Georgia's reap-
portionment plan was not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.75
The district court's conclusion that racial factors dominated the
design of Georgia's reapportionment plan was supported indirectly by
evidence showing the Eleventh District's African-American popula-
tion did not have any significant non-racial community of interest-
80% of the Eleventh District's African-American population came
"from carefully divided counties on its distant fringes, 7 6 lived in areas
67. Miller, 115 S. CL at 2485.
68. Id.
69. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
70. Id. at 2828.
71. Id. at 2832.
72. Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1359 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
73. Id. at 1372.
74. Id. at 1375-77.
75. Id. at 1378-92.
76. Id. at 1376. Georgia got these predominantly African-American fringe areas into the
11th District by:
* Connecting the predominately African-American areas of three widely separated cities
[Atlanta, Augusta, and Savannah] to the 11th District with thin land bridges through pre-
dominately white areas, Id. at 1375-76;
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far apart geographically, and had very different economic, social, cul-
tural, and educational backgrounds.77 In addition, the district court
cited DOJ objection letters seeking purely racial revisions,78 and testi-
mony from Georgia legislators and members of the reapportionment
plan design staff indicating that the desire to comply with DOJ de-
mands was the sole reason for the Eleventh District including Savan-
nah instead of Macon.79
Georgia unsuccessfully sought to justify its reapportionment plan
by arguing that it was designed to:
(1) provide Georgia's African-American population with the op-
portunity to achieve proportionate representation in the U.S.
House of Representatives;
(2) satisfy VRA requirements; and
(3) remedy the effects of past discrimination.8"
In response, the district court first held it would be unconstitutional to
require states to provide each race with proportionate congressional
representation. 81 It then held that states have no compelling interest
in remedying past discrimination separate from doing what is neces-
sary to comply with the VRA, 2 and that attempts to comply with the
VRA are constitutional only if they do no more than what the VRA
minimally requires.83
In the end, the district court found Georgia's reapportionment
plan to be unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to
meet the requirements of the VRA.84 Although, the plan did create
single-member, contiguous districts satisfying one person-one vote re-
quirements, the court found that, "every factor that could realistically
* Adding the more distant Savannah to the 11th District so it could be a majority-minority
district without the nearby Macon, with its large African-American population; then using
Macon to make the Second District a majority-minority district, Id. at 1376-77;
* Excising the African-American areas of Savannah "from [their] traditional economic
place in the 'coastal' region of Georgia," Id. at 1377; and
* Splitting 26 counties. Id. at 1367, 1377.
77. Id. at 1375-76.
78. Id. at 1363-69, 1377.
79. Id. at 1377-78.
80. Id. at 1378.
81. Id. at 1379 (rejecting proportionality because to require it is to require the establish-
ment of racial quotas).
82. Id. at 1380 (noting that the VRA "formalizes, codifies, and universally imposes a 'com-
pelling state interest' to redress historically persistent discriminatory voting practices" and tying
the compelling interest in eradicating voting discrimination to the VRA keeps remedies nar-
rowly tailored to meet the problem).
83. See id. at 1381-83.
84. Id. at 1383-93.
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be subordinated to racial tinkering in fact suffered that fate," thereby
producing an Eleventh District that "disregards economic boundaries,
and.., ignores county and precinct lines at will when needed to reach
black neighborhoods."' s Given that the rejected plans would have in-
creased the number of congressional districts in which African-Ameri-
cans would have realistic opportunities to be elected from one to two,
the pre-cleared plan exceeded what was necessary to avoid retrogres-
sion of African-American voting power.8 6 Moreover, the court found
the Eleventh District was not narrowly tailored to avoid diluting the
power of the African-American vote because "[t]he record fail[ed] to
demonstrate compactness, chronic bloc voting, or reasonably neces-
sary black voter percentages in the Eleventh CongressionalDistrict. '
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the district court's judgment in
every material respect. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held
that reapportionment plans must be subjected to strict scrutiny if race
is the predominant factor in setting district boundaries.8 8 Adopting
almost verbatim the district court's factual findings, the Supreme
Court then affirmed that race was the predominant factor influencing
the crafting of Georgia's reapportionment plan. 9 Finally, the
Supreme Court held that Georgia's reapportionment plan failed the
strict scrutiny test because it "was not required by the Voting Rights
Act under a correct reading of the statute." 90
85. Id. at 1384.
86. Id. at 1384-85.
87. Id. at 1392. The district court again found that the 11th District could not be deemed
compact because its African-American populations were too distant from one another geograph-
ically and too different economically, culturally, and educationally. Id. at 1389-90. To the court,
data about racial polarization was not very accurate and tended to indicate that there had been a
significant degree of racial cross-over voting with black and black-preferred candidates doing
reasonably well in past local and statewide elections. Id. at 1390-91. Thus, the court stated that
"the very lack of solid evidence of black vote cohesion or rampant bloc voting... contributes to
our conclusion that the... Eleventh District was not an appropriate [dilution] remedy." Id. at
1391. The court also found flaws in data concerning the percentage of African-Americans of
voting age required to give African-Americans in the 11th District reasonable opportunities to
elect African-American or African-American preferred candidates. Id. at 1391-92. Accepting
data showing that the African-American percentage of 11th District persons of voting age was
57%, the Court said African-American candidates in the 11th District had an approximate 73%
probability of winning, much higher than the 50% probability minimally required by the VRA.
Id. at 1392.
88. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2487-88 (1995).
89. Id. at 2488-90.
90. Id. at 2491.
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The Court's VRA compliance analysis focussed exclusively on
the non-retrogression principle.91 Finding the plans offering two ma-
jority-minority districts were ameliorative, and concluding that the
race neutral reasons Georgia gave for not originally adopting the max-
black plan were constitutionally adequate, the Court held it was un-




If you look at this Term as a litigator, you get weak knees and
wonder whether you can go forward at all. There is just no question
that this Term the Supreme Court moved toward a very dark night for
affirmative action. But in studying the opinions, I came away with the
conclusion that neither we nor the Court really know what is next.
Looking at the social and legal dynamics of the Court, Justice
O'Connor appears to be the fifth vote in all three cases. However, she
is not a certain vote for the proposition suggested by these cases-that
race remedies cannot be used anymore. Justice O'Connor's opinions
put her right in the middle. Her Adarand opinion reads like the opin-
ions of Justices Scalia and Thomas in discussing the imposition of
strict scrutiny on federally created benign racial classifications.93 Yet,
in striving to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is not fatal in theory
91. Id. at 2491-94.
92. Id. at 2492. This concludes Professor Gary Allison's summary of this Term's equal op-
portunity cases. What follows is derived from the remarks of Professor Allison and Louis
Bullock.
93. Justices Scalia and O'Connor emphasize individual rights over group rights. Justice
Scalia proclaims that "[i]ndividuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination
should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor
or a debtor race." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice O'Connor opines that "the Constitution protect[s] persons, not groups.
[Therefore] [i]t follows ... that all governmental action based on race-a group classification
..- should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal
protection of the laws has not been infringed." Id. at 2112-13 (citation omitted).
Like Justice Thomas, Justice O'Connor emphasizes that all racial classifications are poten-
tially dangerous whether or not the intent behind their creation is benign. Justice Thomas calls
affirmative action programs "racial paternalism" that may "engender attitudes of superiority or
... provoke resentment" among those burdened by affirmative action and "stamp minorities
with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude
that they are 'entitled' to preferences." Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring). And Justice
O'Connor quotes approvingly from Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980), for the proposition that programs of this kind are "perceived by many
as resting on an assumption that those who are granted ... special preference are less qualified
in some respect ... identified purely by race" and "that perception ... can only exacerbate
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but always fatal in fact, Justice O'Connor finds common ground with
Justice Ginsburg.94 She even makes a real attempt to tell us that, in
her opinion, there are race remedies which can pass the strict scrutiny
test.95 Unfortunately, with her standing in the middle, we are left
without knowing what those remedies are.
Moreover, it is significant that in all three cases the factual find-
ings of the majority and dissenting opinions tell two different stories.
Indeed, you get different legal results if you apply the majority's con-
stitutional tests to the facts found by the dissent.96 This shows the
Court does not yet have a majority for the proposition that all racial
classifications, benign or malign, are unconstitutional.
For now, we must wait until Justice O'Connor tells us what is sat-
isfactory, where we can have race remedies. Perhaps her next opin-
ion will offer more specific guidelines as to what classifications will
survive strict scrutiny.
rather than reduce racial prejudice" and "delay the time when race will become a truly irrele-
vant, or... insignificant, factor." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113
(1995) (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 545).
94. In fact Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg are obviously lobbing different openings back
and forth to one another. Compare id. at 2117-18 (parts III.D. and IV.) with id. at 2134-36
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (professing to see much agreement among the disparate views of the
Court).
95. See id. at 2117.
96. In Jenkins, the dissenting Justice Souter found that the district court required Missouri
to continue with the quality remedial educational programs because Missouri had failed to show
what the effects of those programs had been, not because KCMSD students had failed to achieve
national norms on achievement tests. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2078-81 (1995) (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also found that the district court had ordered certain salary
increases to maintain a program for remediating the detrimental effects of segregation on stu-
dent achievement rather than to attract students from other school districts. Id. at 2081 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Souter made a compelling case that it was segregation, not inte-
gration, that caused white flight, thereby entitling the district court to use remedies that had
interdistrict effects. Id. at 2083-87 (Souter, J., dissenting).
In Adarand, Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion contains a detailed factual comparison of
the DBE programs and the set-aside program approved in Fullilove by Justices purporting to use
the strict scrutiny standard. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2128-30 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). This factual finding emphasizes that the DBE program: includes non-
minorities, excludes minorities that are truly not disadvantaged, provides for reviewability so the
program may be wound down as the need to help small business owners from disadvantaged
backgrounds recedes, and arises from extensive congressional findings documenting well the
need for affirmative action. Id.
In Miller, Justice Ginsburg's dissent offers a description of Georgia's 11th District that can-
not be squared with how it was described by the majority. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475,
2502-05 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She notes that the 11th District: is not of bizarre
shape, respects the boundaries of political subdivisions better than many of Georgia's other dis-
tricts, reflects political compromises to accommodate the needs of certain state legislators, is
substantially different than the DOJ's max-black plan, and recognizes that African-Americans
share many common bonds based on ethnic identity that transcend other bases of identity. Id.
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B. Gary Allison
I agree that strict scrutiny may not be fatal in fact to the DBE
programs in Adarand. In her Adarand dissent, Justice Ginsburg cites
statistics showing:
* African-Americans are much more likely to be turned down
for home loans and business opportunities than are white per-
sons with the same credentials; and
* women, African-Americans and minorities in general get terri-
ble automobile deals by comparison to the deals offered to
white males even when they use the same negotiating script.97
So, it is likely that real discrimination can be found to justify the need
for the programs at issue in Adarand 8
I am much more concerned about Jenkins. If we really have a
commitment to equal opportunity, it ought to be reflected in our
schools where we are preparing people to compete.
I very much encourage every person here to purchase Jonathan
Kozol's SAVAGE INEQUALITIEs. 99 This book documents how the
traditional U.S. commitment to funding and controlling public schools
at the local level trapped large numbers of children in terribly un-
derfunded inner city schools as people and tax bases moved to the
suburbs. Now this may be an inequality of class issue, but increasingly
it looks like a race issue when you see who is trapped in the poor inner
city districts across the nation. Shamefully, in San Antonio Independ-
ent School District v. Rodriguez,100 the U.S. Supreme Court found that
the Equal Protection Clause does not contain a remedy for this educa-
tional inequality.10 1
97. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2135 n.4 (1995).
98. See id. at 2135.
99. KozoL, supra note 5.
100. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
101. In Rodriguez, the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny review to state educational laws
that caused great disparities of educational resources among school districts. Id. at 40. The
Court then found that the state's educational laws rationally furthered the legitimate state pur-
pose of keeping local control over schools. Id. at 55.
The Court refused to apply strict scrutiny to the state's educational laws because it found
that education was not a fundamental right protected by the Constitution, id. at 35, and the
education laws did "not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class." Id. at 28.
According to the Court, the relevant class was not suspect because it was large, diverse, and
"unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable
wealth than other districts." Id. Thus, said the Court, this class had "none of the traditional
indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a his-
tory of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Id.
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In Jenkins, the Court split over the cause of white flight. The ma-
jority believed it was caused by integration, 10 2 but the dissent rein-
forced the district court's finding that segregation, not its remedy,
caused the white flight.103 In essence, the majority believes whites got
upset and left school districts only when they were desegregated. 1°4
By contrast, the dissent noted that segregation often caused dreadful
deterioration of schools serving predominantly minority student bod-
ies.'05 As a consequence, according to the dissent, integration has re-
quired districts either to force white children to go to run down
schools or to undertake very expensive repairs or replacements of the
deficient schools.'0 6 These circumstances, said the dissent, may have
caused many whites to leave segregated school districts for the sub-
urbs, because they did not want to wait and see what integration
would produce.10 7 This certainly happened in Kansas City, for by the
time the first remedial order was entered in 1984, thirty years after the
Supreme Court ordered public school desegregation in Brown, the
KCMSD student population had gone from being predominantly
white to predominantly minority.018 Nevertheless, in a shameful deci-
sion, the Court expressly held it is not constitutionally permissible to
chase white flight with magnet programs capable of luring whites back
to the inner city schools'10 9
I think the Jenkins majority was really upset by how the district
court judge had found a way to get around Rodriguez. He had man-
aged to force Missouri to pump millions of dollars into the
KCMSD."10 The Court cut this funding off, mandating a separate and
unequal world, but it was not willing to say so directly.
111
102. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2052-53 (1995).
103. Id. at 2083-87 (Souter, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2052.
105. See id. at 2086 (Souter, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. African-American students constituted 18.9% of KCMSD's enrollment during the 1954-
55 academic year, but 1970 was the last year KCMSD was a majority white district. Initial Jen-
kins, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (W.D. Mo. 1984). By the 1983-84 academic year, African-Ameri-
can students constituted 67.7% of KCMSD's enrollment, and white enrollment had decreased in
absolute numbers by over 80% since 1959. Id. at 1495.
109. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2051-54.
110. Id. at 2043-45.
111. However, in an earlier Supreme Court case involving these parties, Justice Kennedy
wrote in a concurring opinion: "It cannot be contended that interdistrict comparability ... is
itself a constitutional command. We have long since determined that 'unequal expenditures be-
tween children who happen to reside in different districts' do not violate the Equal Protection
Clause." Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 76 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973)).
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One thing I would like you to respond to, Lou, is how Justice
Thomas' opinions seem to reflect, in my opinion, almost a pathologi-
cal self-hatred. He is constantly playing the race card, saying that pro-
grams designed to help victims of discrimination in fact have pinned
on them the badge of racial inferiority."'
C. Louis Bullock
Justice Thomas' opinions were very articulate and had a power
and a passion you do not see very often in Supreme Court decisions.
This is especially true in Jenkins, where he began by blasting desegre-
gation orders because he believes they carry an underlying presump-
tion that every thing black is bad and all-black institutions are
inferior." 3 He gets really passionate in Adarand, using very hot rhet-
oric to state his belief that affirmative race remedies hurt the very
people they are intended to help." 4 In fact, he goes so far as to say
that affirmative action is as morally repugnant as the racial discrimina-
tion and segregation of the past." 5
I think Justice Thomas is having an effect. He not only gives
more passion to Scalia, who has his own passion in these cases,1 6 he
seems also to be having a real impact on Justice O'Connor. In the
past, Justice O'Connor has said that Justice Marshall had a very
profound effect upon her view of racial discrimination in this coun-
try.117 She found it very moving to hear him tell about separate
restrooms, towns where there were no hotel rooms for blacks, and the
112. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (Thomas, J., con-
curring); Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2062 (Thomas. J., concurring).
113. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2062, 2064-66 (Thomas, J., concurring).
114. See quotations from Justice Thomas' Adarand opinion supra note 93.
115. 1 believe that there is a "moral [and] constitutional equivalence" . . . between laws
designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race.., to
foster some current notion of equality.
In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign preju-
dice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
116. For example, Justice Scalia closes his Adarand opinion by stating:
To pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even for the most admirable and benign
of purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that
produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we
are just one race here. It is American.
Id.
117. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN.
L. Rav. 1217, 1217-20 (1992).
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type of terror that they faced in southern cities."18 Now we have Jus-
tice Thomas expressing outrage about constitutional remedies Justice
O'Connor had thought were helpful to victims of discrimination.
When you read her Adarand opinion, you begin to see that Justice
Thomas' passion may have influenced her to emphasize how race con-
scious remedies may be dangerous." 9 This explains how we ended up
getting strict scrutiny.
Doing psycho-babble on Justice Thomas always makes good after
dinner conversation. He is still hurting, clearly, from the bruising of
his nomination process and suggestions that he would not have been a
Supreme Court Justice but for affirmative action. He seems to take
this as personal criticism rather than recognizing that he and other
very bright people would not have come to the surface if our racial
policies had not changed. But, whatever you think of the man, clearly
he is bright and capable.
D. Gary Allison
It saddens me that in his Jenkins opinion Justice Thomas all but
accuses Justice Marshall of pursuing a theory of racial inferiority to
win Brown.120 In fact, he almost accuses Justice Marshall of pursuing
a plan to mix the races out of belief that anything all black is
inferior.' 2 '
Those who have studied Brown know Justice Marshall sought
public school desegregation in part because he believed schools at-
tended by minority children would continue to be underfunded unless
whites had a stake in their quality.22 More importantly, he sought
integration because he believed segregation imposed a badge of slav-
ery on African-American children, meaning it produced in African-
118. Id.
119. See supra note 93 for commentary about the area of agreement between Justices
Thomas and O'Connor in Adarand.
120. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2062,2064-66 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
121. Justice Thomas states:
[I]f separation itself is a harm, and if integration.., is the only way that blacks can
receive a proper education, then there must be something inferior about blacks. Under
this theory, segregation injures blacks because blacks, when left on their own, cannot
achieve. To my way of thinking, that conclusion is the result of a jurisprudence based
upon a theory of black inferiority.
Id. at 2065-66 (emphasis added).
122. Thus, Justice Marshall stated in his 1952 Brown oral argument that separate but equal
statutes "were unconstitutional in their enforcement" in part "because they ... produced...
inevitable inequalities in physical facilities." ARGUMENr. THE ORAL ARGrMENT BEFORE THE
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American children inner feelings of inferiority that negatively affected
their performances. 2 3 Justice Marshall tried to spotlight these effects
to show that without integration we do not have a commitment to
equal opportunity worthy of our Declaration of Independence. 24
Finally, about the bantering back and forth in Miller between Jus-
tice Ginsburg and the majority on the issue of whether race is a per-
missible political identity; the majority said it is insulting to use race as
a major factor in putting together a congressional district because it
presumes that people of the same race have identical political views
solely because of their race.125 Justice Ginsburg answered that ethnic-
ity is a matter of self-identity that has a long and storied history in the
United States. 26 She further contends that ethnic identity largely
transcends other identity factors such as class, social status, or employ-
ment. 27 Finally, she asks why every type of identity other than ethnic
identity can be used in drawing congressional district lines?128
People ought to remember it was the Republican Justice Depart-
ment that insisted upon the max-black strategy.129 The strategy was a
part of a Republican plan to dilute Democratic votes.130 The plan has
been very effective, because the overall number of Democrats elected
to Congress from the South has declined precipitously as the number
123. In his 1952 Brown oral argument, Justice Marshall summed up expert testimony intro-
duced at the district court regarding the psychic injuries produced by segregation by stating:
"Negro children have road blocks put up in their minds as a result of this segregation, so that the
amount of education that they take in is much less than other students take in." Id. at 38.
124. Justice Marshall made this point quite forcefully in his 1954 oral arguments in Brown,
wherein he told the Court:
[W~e submit the only way to arrive at this decision [against integration] is to find that
for some reason Negroes are inferior to all other human beings.
Nobody will stand in the Court and urge that, and in order to arrive at the decision
that they want us to arrive at, there would have to be some recognition of a reason why
of all of the multitudinous groups of people in this country you have to single out
Negroes and give them this separate treatment.
It can't be because of slavery in the past, because there are very few groups in this
country that haven't had slavery some place back in the history of their groups. It can't
be color because there are Negroes as white as the drifted snow, with blue eyes, and
they are just as segregated as the colored man.
The only thing can be is an inherent determination that the people who were for-
merly in slavery.., shall be kept as near that stage as is possible. and now is the time
*.. that this Court should make it clear that is not what our Constitution stands for.
Id. at 239-40.
125. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2486 (1995).
126. Id. at 2504-05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. The DOJ precleared Georgia's version of the max-black plan on April 2, 1992. Id. at
2484. This was on President Bush's watch.
130. See Jim Sleeper, Rigging the Vote by Race, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1992, at A14.
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of black Democratic Congressmen increased dramatically.'31 We
should celebrate the increase in the election of African-Americans to
Congress, but we should also realize that Republicans helped cause
this through old fashioned political, rather than racial,
gerrymandering.
E. Louis Bullock
That's right! You must get the most votes to win an election. One
way of ensuring this is to get voters who may not vote for you out of
your district. That is exactly what they did in Miller. The map draw-
ing contest between the majority and the dissent was fun. First the
majority gives its description of the Eleventh District, and you see this
multi-hydra thing with arms snaking out and say: "Boy, those are
some pretty long and skinny arms.' 32 But then the dissent compares
the Eleventh District to the especially long and skinny district shot
down in Shaw,133 and you begin to see the Eleventh District as look-
ing very much like constitutionally drawn political districts look.
Oklahoma districts have looked like the one described in Shaw.
Oklahoma Democrats historically tried to corral most of the Republi-
can vote into one district (the Fifth Congressional District) by carving
the wealthy precincts out of Oklahoma City and connecting them to
Bartlesville with a narrow passage way snaking through Edmond,
Enid, and Ponca City. Now Republicans are getting even. I think the
Court is being a little bit disingenuous when it says Georgia aban-
doned the traditional ways of districting.
What concerns me most about Miller is the Court seeming to do
its best to stifle debate about race by killing the outcome of reappor-
tionment or other important activities if race was a significant fac-
tor.'34 Georgia's reapportionment plan would have been upheld if it
had been viewed as gerrymandering Democrats. However, doing the
same thing with African Americans, Chinese, Japanese or Hispanic
voters is fatal.
131. In 1990, 59 percent of the House members from the 13 states
stretching from Virginia to Texas were white Democrats. Now only 28 percent are, and
there are none in Georgia and Louisiana. The proportion of seats held by Republicans
has grown from 35 percent to 57 percent, while the Democrats who are members of
minorities have increased their share from 6 percent to 15 percent.
Kevin Sack, POLITICS: IN THE SOUTH; A Southern Democrat Resists The Lure of Party
Switching, N.Y. Tmims, Jan. 20, 1996, § 1.
132. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488-89, app. at 2495-96.
133. See Justice Ginsburg's description of the 11th District supra note 96.
134. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
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We simply cannot address our race problems without talking
about race. If the Court's view prevails, and politicians cannot talk
about race, we might feel better temporarily-but racial hostility can-
not be covered up in the long run. It is an infection that may lead to
our demise, so we must talk about race and pass legislation that gives
us all a voice to help bring us together.135
135. It appears that the African-American voice in Congress will soon become significantly
weaker. For in a recent article, the Washington Post reported that a federal district court had
reapportioned Georgia to provide only one majority-minority district, giving rise to fears among
voting rights advocates and civil right leaders that Shaw and Miller will cause the African-Ameri-
can Congressman to become an endangered species. ACLU to Appeal Decision Remapping Ga.
Districts; Plan to Drop Majority-Black Areas 'Retrogressive', WAsH. Posr, December 15,1995, at
A3. The article notes that "[o]f the 37 current black U.S. House members, not including dele-
gates from the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands, only three represent districts that are
not majority black: Reps. Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.), Gary A. Franks (R-Conn.) and J.C.
Watts (R-Okla.)." Id. Under the Court's reapportionment plan, "[i]nstead of three majority-
black districts with African American voting-age populations of 60 percent, 57 percent and 52
percent, the new map contains one majority-black district and six districts with black populations
ranging from 23 percent to 35 percent." Id. According to the Washington Post, "[o]pponents of
the plan said ... the effect of the new map was to dilute black voting strength to make it easier
for conservative white Democrats to get elected in Republican strongholds." Id.
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